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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
APPELLATE REVIEW OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
The determination of interlocutory orders by a federal district
court may hinge upon the resolution of substantial legal issues which,
while independent from the principal matters in controversy, affect
important substantive rights.1 As crucial to the conduct of the proceedings as these orders might be, litigants seeking immediate appellate
relief from adverse intermediary decrees must first surmount the imposing barrier of the final judgment rule.2 This rule, one of the dominant factors in modem federal appellate practice s limits the jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals to review of final decisions emanating from the
district courts.4 Despite its apparent clarity, the finality requirement
has resulted in confusion, particularly with respect to the appealability
1 Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); Eisen v. Carlisle
9- Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 120, 120 (2d Cir. I966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
228 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The final judgment rule first emerged in the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which established the federal court system. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21-25,
1 Stat. 73, 83-85. It provided that appeals could be had "from final decrees in a district
court in causes of action of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... to the next circuit
court .... I Stat. at 83. Furthermore, "final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a
district court" were allowed to be "re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit
court." Id. at 84. The difference between the two appeals procedures centered upon the
monetary requirement of each action at the district level, the former being $300 and the
latter only $50. This provision was carried forward when the courts of appeals were
established. Act of Mar. 3,1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1133.
3 DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962); 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
110.06, at 105 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MoomR].
The rule has not met with universal approval. It has been criticized for causing
unnecessary and protracted litigation over the meaning of a "final" order. Crick, The
Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 557 (1932). Secondly, its rigid application can result in irreparable injury. Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible
Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 1102 (1950). See Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (Jackson, J.). Nevertheless, it does
serve to minimize both the harassment, delays, and expense of piecemeal litigation.
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325 (1940). See Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders-A
Structural Reform Toward Redefinition, 7 SUrrOLK U.L. REy. 1037, 1039-40 (1973); Note,
Statutory Criteriafor Review in the Federal Courts: The ProperIndicia of Appealability?,
29 U. PrrT. L. Rv. 365 (1967).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) provides:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court.
Appeals sought to be taken from the highest court of a state to the Supreme Court
face the same requirements of finality. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). See generally Note, The
Requirement of a Final Judgment or Decree for Supreme Court Review of State Courts,
73 YALE L.J. 515 (1964).
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of a trial court's refusal to disqualify opposing counsel.5 In Silver
ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,6 the Second Circuit,
sitting en banc, overturned prior circuit precedent 7 and held that orders
denying disqualification, as well as those excluding counsel from further
participation, are final decisions and therefore appealable.8
In Silver Chrysler, defendants' attorneys, Kelley, Drye, Warren,
Clark, Carr & Ellis, moved to disqualify Hammond 8. Schreiber as
counsel for the plaintiff.9 Dale Schreiber, when associated with Kelley
Drye, had represented Chrysler in other litigation. 10 Upon leaving
Kelley Drye, Schreiber formed his own firm, specializing in the representation of automobile dealers in actions against manufacturers, including Chrysler.." In support of their motion, defendants argued that
Schreiber may have possessed access to confidential information and
that his further participation in the case would create an appearance
of impropriety.' 2 District Judge Jack B. Weinstein found to the contrary and denied the motion.13 Subsequently, Chrysler Motors sought
appellate review of the district court determination by direct appeal to
the Second Circuit. 4 In addition, defendants petitioned for an extraor5 See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.

6 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
7 See Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 1959). In Marco v. Dulles, 268
F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir. 1959), the court, constrained by the principle of stare decisis, followed
Fleischer.

8 496 F.2d at 805-06.
9 Id. at 801; Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
583 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
'0 496 F.2d at 801. The defendants alleged that, in addition to real estate and business matters, Schreiber had represented Chrysler in actions brought by Chrysler dealers.
370 F. Supp. at 584-85.
11496 F.2d at 801.
12 Id.; 370 F. Supp. at 583.
13 370 F. Supp. at 591. The district court found that Schreiber had no actual knowledge of matters substantially related to the Silver Chrysler case. Id. at 585-86. Furthermore,
the judge ruled that such knowledge should not be imputed to Schreiber merely because
of his prior association with the defendants' law firm. Finally, the court concluded that
no impropriety had been established. Id. at 587-89.
14496 F.2d at 802. The defendants tried a number of tactics in order to present their
case to the Second Circuit in a cognizable form. They first requested that the district
court amend its order denying disqualification to include a certification pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). Under this section, the district court in a civil case can make an
order appealable by including in that order a statement that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation ....
Id. If the order contains such a statement, the circuit court may, in its discretion, permit
the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 5 (1970). However, the district court in Silver Chrysler
declined to certify. 496 F.2d at 801-02.
The defendants then sought permission to appeal via § 1292(b), notwithstanding the
absence of the certification. Although technically the district court must certify the
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dinary writ, directing the district court to amend its original order to
provide for disqualification. 15
Generally, to be final, a decision must be "one which ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment."'16 Inevitably, however, both Congress' 7 and
the courts' 8 have engrafted exceptions onto the final judgment rule in
question, there is authority for the proposition that the congressional policy behind
§ 1292(b) can be used to support the jurisdiction of a circuit court to hear an appeal if
the issues presented are "fundamental to the further conduct of the case" and the case is

one of at least "marginal" finality. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
110.22[3], at 263. See also S. REP. No. 2434, 85th
154 (1964); see 9 MoomR, supra note 3,
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1958). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit denied the defendants' motion.
496 F.2d at 802.
Thirdly, the defendants attempted to obtain a direct appeal by filing a notice of
appeal. The plaintiffs, in turn, moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id.
at 802. Finally, Chrysler Motors sought to present the case to the court by requesting a
writ of mandamus. See note 15 and accompanying text infra. The court consolidated the
petition for mandamus with the motion to dismiss the appeal. 496 F.2d at 802. In sum,
the Second Circuit was inundated with paperwork as a result of the efforts of the tenacious
putative appellants. See note 46 infra.
15496 F.2d at 802. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions .... "
A number of Supreme Court decisions indicate the difficulty a litigant will encounter
when seeking mandamus as an alternative to appeal. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (party seeking relief must establish "clear and indisputable" right to issuance of the writ); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (writs are
"reserved for really extraordinary causes"). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98
n.6 (1967) (courts are to exercise caution in considering petitions for peremptory writs).
16 Catiin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); accord, Gulf Ref. Co. v. United
States, 269 U.S. 125, 136 (1925); Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U.S. 127, 128 (1885). It should be
noted that an order can be final without being the last order in the case. Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
In deciding whether a particular order is a final order, the most important of the
competing factors to be considered by the courts are the "inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other." Id. at 152-53, quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 383 U.S. 507, 511

(1950).
17Interlocutory appeals are permitted in bankruptcy proceedings, 11 U.S.C. § 47
(1970), in specified situations under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970)-

grants and denials of injunctive relief -and

notably appeals from

pursuant to the certification procedure out-

lined in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see note 14 supra. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) (courts of

appeals may issue -rits in aid of their jurisdiction). Cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b) (district
court may direct entry of final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties).
18The first significant judicial inroad on the federal policy against interlocutory
appeals came in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). In Forgay the Supreme

Court asserted its jurisdiction to review, under the finality rule, a decree from the circuit
court which, if unreviewed, would have exposed the appellants to "irreparable injury."
The order appealed from directed immediate transfer of title and possession of property
from appellants to respondents and additionally remanded the case for an accounting.
Forgay set the stage for a line of decisions recognizing that an appeal would lie from
orders directing the transfer of physical property, notwithstanding the fact that the
orders also provided for an accounting and therefore were not technically final. See, e.g.,
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Carondelet Canal and Navigation
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order to alleviate the harshness of strict application. 19 Since the order
in Silver Chrysler clearly was not final in the general sense of the term,
an appeal could not be taken from it unless the order came within one
of the exceptions.
The Second Circuit, in a unanimous en banc opinion authored by
Judge Moore, found that the order was appealable under the exception
announced by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.20 In Cohen, the Court exempted from the strictures of the
rule a
small class [of less than final orders] which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated. 21
In recognizing the order denying disqualification as being a member of
this "small class" and thus finding it to be appealable, the Silver
Chrysler court specifically overruled the Second Circuit precedent of
Fleischer v. Phillips. 22 The court rejected the distinction drawn in
Fleischerwhich permitted appeals to be taken from orders granting the
motion to disqualify, but not from orders denying that motion2 3
In reaching its conclusion, the court embarked upon an analysis
of the precedents, with Cohen serving as the "cornerstone" of the discussion. 24 The Second Circuit viewed Cohen as having enunciated three
"prerequisites" which an order must meet in order to be final.2 5 Although Judge Moore failed to expressly set forth these factors, a reading
of Cohen suggests that to be appealable an order must: (1) definitively
Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914); Thomson v. Dean, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 342 (1868). See
generally 9 MoonE, supra note 3,
110.11, at 137-50.
19 Both courts and commentators agree that an unyielding adhesion to the confines
of the rule can result in the denial of justice. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,
379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950); Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539, 563 (1932);
Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the FinalJudgment Rule, 50 CoLtmt.
L. REv. 1102 (1950).
20 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
21 Id. at 546. The order appealed from denied a motion to require the plaintiff in a

derivative shareholders' suit to post security for costs in accordance with the applicable
state statute. Id. at 544-45.
22264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), noted in 38 TExAs L. REv.
792 (1960); accord, Marco v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Willheim v.
Murchison, 312 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963). Interestingly, Judge Moore, the author of the
court's opinion in Silver Chrysler, dissented from both the Fleischerdecision, 264 F.2d at
518, and that of Marco, 268 F.2d at 193.
23496 F.2d at 805.
24 See 496 F.2d at 802.
25

Id. at 805; see 9 MooRE, supra note 3,

110.10, at 133.

1975]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM

resolve a claim of right collateral to the main cause of action; (2) be
"too important to be denied review"; and (8) result in irreparable harm
2
should review be postponed. 6
The Silver Chrysler court noted that from the time Cohen was
handed down in 1949 until Fleischerwas decided in 1959, the Second
Circuit had found orders both granting and denying disqualification
of counsel to be appealable under Cohen.27 The Fleischercourt, however, though conceding the collateral nature of the claim, nevertheless
held the order denying disqualification to be deficient in the second
and third requirements of the Cohen rule.28 Although the court did not
28 See 337 U.S. at 546.
Decisions subsequent to Cohen have placed varying degrees of emphasis on each of
the three requirements. For example, the Supreme Court initially stressed the element of
irreparable harm. In Swift 9- Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S.
684 (1950), the Court held that an order vacating an attachment of a ship was final.
Justice Frankfurter noted that
[a]ppellate review of the order dissolving the attachment at a later date would be
an empty rite after the vessel had been released and the restoration of the attachment only theoretically possible.
Id. at 689. In subsequent cases, however, the Court demonstrated less concern for the
irreparable harm rationale and instead focused upon the importance of the rights involved. See Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 292, 301-02
(1966), citing Stock v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (appeal permitted from order denying
motion to reduce bail); Roberts v. United States Dist. Ct., 39 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam)
(appeal permitted from order denying leave to appeal in forma pauperis).
An example of a finding that a putatively final order under Cohen was insufficiently
collateral is the decision in DiBella v. United States, 569 U.S. 121 (1962). There, the Court
overturned a Second Circuit determination, 284 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960), that a preindictment motion to suppress evidence made under FEt. R. CaRi. P. 44(e) was directly
appealable under § 1291. The Second Circuit had taken the position that where the
motion to suppress was made prior to indictment its denial was a final disposition of an
independent claim and therefore appealable. 284 F.2d at 898. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this analysis and held
that the mere circumstance of a pre-indictment motion does not transmute the
ensuing evidentiary ruling into an independent proceeding begetting finality even
for the purposes of appealability.
369 U.S. at 131. Rather, the Court was persuaded that the determination was simply
another step in the "federal prosecutorial system leading to a criminal trial." Id.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been less circumspect in looking for the three
prerequisites of Cohen. The Court has emphasized the language in Cohen which suggested
that § 1291 be given a "practical rather than a technical construction." 337 U.S. at 546. The
most notable example of this relaxation is Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S.
148 (1964). There, the Court ruled that where the order is one of "marginal" finality the
courts can hear the appeal if the order determines issues "fundamental to the further
conduct of the case." Id. at 154.
It has also been suggested that review under the Cohen rule should be reserved for
the resolution of issues of general importance beyond the interests of the parties involved.
Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
27 496 F.2d at 802-03, citing Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956), wherein the Second Circuit stated: "[With respect to
appealability no distinction exists between orders granting disqualification and those
refusing to do so," Id. at 556.
28264 F.2d at 517. See text accompanying note 26 supra. The Fleischer decision was
cited with approval in Marco v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959), wherein the Second
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speak in terms of specific requirements, Judge Clark stated that the
ordering of a disqualification seriously impedes the conduct of the
action and impairs the attorney's reputation. 29 On the other hand, he
concluded that the order denying disqualification has no permanent
effect in that it merely permits the case to proceed. 0 Consequently, the
denial was viewed as insufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.
In Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit elected to "return to the
wisdom" of its former position and rejected the Fleischer distinction
as having "no sufficient basis."'31 In so holding, the court reevaluated
the nature of the impact of a district court's erroneous denial of disqualification. It was felt that further participation by the plaintiffs
counsel in contravention of an attorney's ethical responsibility 2 might
3
well taint the entire trial and result in an irretrievable loss of rights
Moreover, the court indicated that review after final judgment would
be especially inadequate in this context. 4
The Second Circuit's examination of the order in terms of its
importance and potential for an irreparable loss of rights enjoys the
support of at least four other circuits. The District of Columbia, 35
Circuit indicated that immediate appeal of an order denying disqualification could be
had only pursuant to certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The Ninth Circuit,
in Cord v. Smith, 388 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964), agreed with this reasoning but nonetheless
granted mandamus and reviewed the question. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
29 264 F.2d at 517.
30Id.
31496 F.2d at 805.
32 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4, which provides: "A lawyer
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
83 496 F.2d at 805. The court established the collateral nature of the order, one of the
Cohen requirements, without serious discussion. 496 F.2d at 805.
34 Id. The court relied upon the Ninth Circuit's observation that
[c]ontinued participation as an attorney, by one who is disqualified by conflict of
interest from so doing, will bring about the very evil which the rule against his
participation is designed to prevent, and a subsequent reversal based upon such
participation cannot undo the damage that will have been done as a result of such
participation.
Id. at 804, quoting Cord v. Smith, 838 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1964). Judge Moore
believed it "fatuous to suppose that review of the final judgment will provide adequate
relief." 496 F.2d at 805.
35 In Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971), a group of
union members brought suit against the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and
its officials, seeking both an accounting of union funds and the restitution of allegedly
misappropriated funds. Plaintiffs moved in the district court for an order disqualifying
the regular UMWA outside counsel. Plaintiffs supported this motion with claims that said
counsel would be compensated from the UMWA treasury and that a conflict of interest
existed between the officers and the union. 448 F.2d at 1177. The district court issued an
order denying disqualification. The court of appeals considered the merits without disputing the appealability of the order. The district court's order was vacated and the
case remanded.
Thereafter, outside counsel withdrew and was replaced by UMWA's general counsel.
Plaintiffs again moved in the district court to disqualify and again were rebuffed. In lieu
of seeking a direct appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court of appeals for further relief,
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Third,36 and Fifth 37 Circuits have allowed direct appeals from orders
denying disqualification. The Fourth Circuit intimated that it would
relying upon the court's prior opinion, which had declared that representation of the
defendants by regular UMWA outside counsel was improper. Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) [hereinafter
Yablonski 11]. Petitioners alleged that the denial of the second motion to disqualify
failed to give full effect to the court of appeals' prior mandate. The court agreed and
granted the petition.
While the court in Yablonski II was not faced with a direct appeal, it set forth its
policy with respect to the appealability of orders denying disqualification of counsel The
court distinguished between disqualification orders based solely on ethical considerations
and those based on impingement on a specific legislative policy, only the latter being
110.13[10], at 190. In addiappealable. Id. at 1038 n.9; accord, 9 MooRE, supra note 3,
tion, in determining that it had the power under the circumstances to grant the peculiar
relief sought in the nature of mandamus, the court indicated an acceptance of the reasoning of the Ninth (and now Second) Circuit with respect to the irreparable harm
which an unreviewed erroneous decision would entail. 454 F.2d at 1039, quoting Cord v.
Smith, 338 F-2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1964).
This rationale was particularly forceful in light of the facts in the case. The court
cited the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401
(1970), as favoring the "representation of a labor union by counsel free of possibly
conflicting obligations to adverse parties." 454 F.2d at 1039. The court felt that representation of the union and its officials by the UMWA general counsel would be just as offensive
to this legislative policy as would representation by the UMWA's regular outside counsel.
The court was persuaded that an appeal after final judgment could not rectify the frustration of the legislative will that would result from the district court's order. It was concluded that the potential frustration of public policy would render the order denying
disqualification not only directly appealable but also, on the facts presented, sufficient
grounds for issuance of a special writ. Id. However, the court refrained from issuing a
writ of mandamus in hope that the district court would be sufficiently impressed with
its decision to rectify its own error. Id. at 1042.
80 Greene v. Singer Co., Civil No. 71-1835 (3d Cir., Nov. 2, 1971). Greene involved an
action based on unfair competition, antitrust violations, and patent infringement. Defendant, The Singer Company, moved in the district court for an order disqualifying one of
plaintif's attorneys from further participation in the case. This motion was supported
with allegations that the attorney in question was previously employed as a patent attorney
for a firm which had been acquired by the defendant, and that while in the employ of
the acquired company he "represented [that] company in the matter which [was] the
subject of [the instant] law suit." Id. at 2. Like Silver Chrysler, the Greene court expressed
concern regarding the possibility of irreparable harm. Indeed, in recognizing the order as
final and appealable under Cohen, the court conceded:
To require appellant to await a final judgment on the merits before testing the
legality of the order denying the disqualification may, for practical purposes, deny
it the reality of appellate processes.
id. at 3.
It should be noted, however, that the court added a caveat against excessive extrapolation from its decision, saying: "We do not hold that every ruling relating to conflict
of interest by an attorney should activate the Cohen rule." Id. Apparently, it was the
allegation that plaintiff's counsel had had a prior connection with the defendant, involving the subject matter of the ongoing litigation, which convinced the court to depart from
its generally restrictive approach to the collateral order rule. See, e.g., Hackett v. General
Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1973) (Greene cited
as an exception to general policy).
87Tomlinson v. Florida Iron and Metal, Inc., 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961). Tomlinson
involved an action to recover taxes which were alleged to have been collected illegally.
Tomlinson, District Director of Internal Revenue, moved in the district court for an
order disqualifying plaintiff's counsel based on a federal statute, 5 U.S.C. § 99 (1958), as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970). This section made it unlawful for a former government
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treat an order denying disqualification as final.38 On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit refuses to regard a denial as appealable.-9 Nonetheless,
giving recognition to the loss of rights that a failure to review might
entail, the Ninth Circuit would take cognizance of the order if presented with a petition for a special writ.40 In the alternative, the court
might, in its discretion, accept an appeal certified by the district court.41
employee to act as counsel with respect to any claim against the United States which was
pending while he was employed by the agency against which the claim was made.
In Tomlinson, the Fifth Circuit, like the District of Columbia Circuit (see note 35
supra), was concerned with the possible irreparable "frustration of a public policy." 291
F.2d at 334. Since plaintiff's counsel fell within the statutory prohibition, a refusal by the
court to review the order denying his disqualification would have resulted in a direct
contravention of an express legislative policy which could not "be avoided or mitigated
by any appeal taken after trial." Id.
Significantly, however, in a later case in which disqualification was sought solely on
ethical grounds, the Fifth Circuit found the underlying rationale of Tomlinson broad
enough to support treatment of an order denying disqualification as final. Uniweld Prods.,
Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968).
38United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). In this
criminal prosecution, the government moved to disqualify defendant's counsel on the
ground that he had previously represented an individual who was expected to be called
as a material witness for the prosecution. The district court granted the motion, but
defendant neglected to seek an appeal. Instead, the defendant made an application to
the court of appeals seeking review of the district court's order. The Fourth Circuit indicated that if the defendant had sought a direct appeal of the order it would have treated
the order as final and appealable under Cohen. Notwithstanding the fact that the court
faced an order granting disqualification, it supported its conclusion by citing the Second
Circuit's original position in Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956), wherein orders denying as well as granting disqualification were treated as final under Cohen. 462 F.2d at 318. See note 27 supra.
In light of its determination that the order was previously appealable as final, the
court concluded that it would not treat the defendant's application as a petition for a
special writ, nor would it grant such a writ. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30-32 (1943), wherein it
was held that the special writ should not be used as a substitute for an appeal.
39 Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1964).
40 Id. at 521, applying 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970); accord, Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United
States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966). Professor Moore supports this position,
by stating:
The view of the Second [referring to the Fleischer decision) and the Ninth Circuits seems clearly preferable. Questions of counsels' conflict of interest are almost
invariably questions of fact best left to the trier of fact. In the unusual case in
which the denial of a motion to disqualify presents a novel question of law,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is available, as is, in a truly exceptional case, mandamus.
9 MooRE,supra note 3,
110.13[10], at 190.
The Tenth Circuit takes an equally restrictive approach. It refuses all review of a
denial of disqualification except in extreme circumstances. See Waters v. Western Co. of
N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971), wherein an appeal from an order denying
disqualification certified and permitted under section 1292(b) was dismissed as improvidently granted.
41 338 F.2d at 521, disscussing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). See note 14 supra. The court
also rejected the argument that a refusal to disqualify counsel should be treated as a
denial of injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). See note 17 supra. The court
concluded that the refusal was more in the nature of an exercise of "the supervisory
power of the federal courts over attorneys appearing before them ....
" 338 F.2d at 521.
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Although representing a restrictive viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit's
position finds support in the general policy against piecemeal litigation
which underlies the final judgment rule.42 Moreover, it evidences the
reluctance of courts and commentators to add yet another class of appealable orders to the ever-increasing volume which the appellate
courts are now being called upon to review.43
Despite this concern for the burden upon courts of appeals, the
Second Circuit's position appears consonant with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Cohen. Since an order denying disqualification of counsel
satisfies the three requirements of Cohen,44 courts should not attempt
to avoid applying Cohen for the sake of limiting their case load.45 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's approach results in a contorted review
procedure, relegating such significant orders to a state of quasi-appealability and creating an inordinate amount of uncertainty. 46 Direct
42 See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); note 3 supra.
43 See, eg., Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.
1972) (Friendly, C. J.) ("Cohen must be kept within narrow bounds, lest the exception
swallow the salutary 'final judgment rule' "); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule,
45 TEXAS L. REv. 292, 317-20 (1966) (noting there are so many exceptions to Cohen
110.13[10], at
that the rule may no longer be viable). See also 9 MooRE, supra note 3,
190.
There is a legitimate need to protect the docket of the courts of appeals. For example,
in the seven-year period from 1966 to 1973 the number of filings in the eleven circuits
increased 117.6%. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal
Appellate System, 59 ComRELL L. Rnv. 576, 579 (1974). See generally Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
NationalLaw, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1969); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis
in Judicial Administration, 42 TA.s L. R v.949 (1964).
44 See text accompanying notes 26 S- 31-34 supra.
45 Rejection of Cohen will not necessarily achieve the sought-after reduction of
workload. See note 46 infra. The problems of calendar congestion would best be dealt
with by structural and substantive reforms. See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets
and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law,
82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 567-68 (1969); Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow,
59 CoP.mN.tL L. Rv. 634 (1974); Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs
of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CoRNE.L L. REv. 576 (1974). See also Hearings on H.R.
7378 Before the Subcomm. on the Commission on Revision of Judicial Circuits of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
46 The alternatives of certification and mandamus are both productive of uncertainty.
In order to obtain certification, the putative appellant must establish the applicability of
§ 1292(b) to the satisfaction of the district court. A refusal to certify would cut off the
appeal in the formative stages. Moreover, even if certification is obtained, the appellate
court has discretion to refuse to accept the case. See note 14 supra. A writ of mandamus
is issued only in rare instances and an even greater burden must be satisfied by the party
seeking relief. See note 15 supra. Questions will undoubtedly arise as to what situations

are sufficiently exigent to justify the use of this extraordinary power.
The burden upon the judiciary is compounded by the fact that a diligent attorney,
in order to protect his client, will attempt both approaches. This is precisely what occurred in Silver Chrysler. See note 14 supra. In Silver Chrysler, the court noted that the

"procedural uncertainties" resulted in the court's having to consider a notice of appeal,
a motion for permission to appeal and a petition for a special writ. In addition, the
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appeal offers a uniform and expeditious 47 vehicle for consideration of
orders deemed "too important to be denied review" 48 by an impressive
number of circuit courts of appeals.4 9
Silver Chrysler represents an example of the Second Circuit's
willingness to apply Cohen in a proper setting. The court's decision,
however, is predicated on the substantial effect the denial of disqualification of counsel may have on the litigation. Thus, the case offers no
indication that the Second Circuit is prepared to depart from its generally restrictive treatment of the collateral order rule. 0
EdgarJ. Royce
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF CLASS ACTION DESIGNATION

Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.
Interlocutory appeals are not viewed favorably by most courts.'
Fearing that piecemeal appeals would result in a waste of judicial energy, Congress early established the final judgment rule2 and has condistrict court was requested to certify an appeal. Each of these attempts to perfect an
appeal, with the exception of the notice of appeal, "included the same repetitious statements of, fact and law and each required time-consuming considerations by the courts."
496 F.2d at 802. On balance, the disposition of these matters could result in a greater
waste of time and expense than would result if the arguably appealable order were
directly reviewed.
47 The interest in conservation and careful allocation of judicial resources underlying
the final judgment rule can, in some cases, militate in favor of permitting a direct appeal
As the Silver Chrysler court noted:
By holding such an order [denying disqualification] directly appealable, we elminate the uncertainties (and the paperwork) attendant to resorting to § 1292(b)
and]or § 1651. Since the ultimate objective is to bring before an appellate court
an important question which, if unresolved, might well taint a trial, why should
not this question be presented before judicial and attorney time may have been
needlessly expended?
496 F.2d at 806.
48 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
49 See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
50 See, e.g., Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972);
West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1970); Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935,
937 (2d Cir. 1968). See also I.B.M. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed sub noma., I.B.M. Corp. v. Edelstein, 42 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S.
June 11, 1973).
Since the decision in Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed its position
on the appealability of disqualification orders. General Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501
F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974).
1 Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963); Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945).
2 The concept of finality can be traced to the first Judiciary Act. Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85. Congress has forbidden piecemeal appeals
from a single controversy in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. The underlying rationale is that appeals of interlocutory orders cause an unjustifiable and intolerable delay since such orders merge into the final judgment and will be ultimately

